THE EQUIVALENCE OF BERTRAND EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY AND COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY

DongJoon Lee (), Sangheon Han (), Yuji Ono () and Joonghwa Oh ()
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DongJoon Lee: Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Japan,, Postal: JP
Sangheon Han: Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Japan, Postal: JP
Yuji Ono: Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Japan, Postal: JP
Joonghwa Oh: Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Japan, Postal: JP

Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, 2016, vol. 7, issue 2, 146-154

Abstract: This paper examines whether Bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly can be duplicated with Cournot competition or not. We show that the degree of product differentiation plays an important role in the duality between those equilibria. Our main claims are two. One is that there exists a unique duality condition that satisfies the equivalence between Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium irrespectively of market structures. The other is that the number of firms of Cournot competition that satisfies Bertrand equilibrium increases with the degree of product differentiation.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srs:jtpref:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:146-154

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