Minority Shareholders and Auditors: A Brief History of a Litigious French Merger

Stephane Trebucq

Accounting History Review, 2007, vol. 17, issue 2, 313-332

Abstract: The case of a French merger can be used to better understand the nature of conflicts of interest and cognitive conflicts between accountants, shareholders, lawyers and judges. This is especially the case when exchange ratios are unfairly established. When caught in a situation of asymmetric information, minority shareholders try to obtain more information about the auditors' report through judicial proceedings. The financial knowledge possessed by the judge then becomes a necessary condition for shareholders to be protected.

Keywords: Auditor; minority shareholder; merger; trial; exchange ratio; fairness opinion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/09585200701376667

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