A case of an early 1900s principal-agent relationship in the Mississippi lumber industry

Timothy McCoy and Dale Flesher

Accounting History Review, 1998, vol. 8, issue 1, 13-31

Abstract: Correspondence for the L. N. Dantzler Lumber Company, dating from 1904, survives in the Lumber Archives of the University of Mississippi. The correspondence is from the personal files of R. Breland, who rose to the position of office manager of the Dantzler Mills. An analysis of the correspondence reveals a unique agency relationship between the Dantzler Lumber Company and Breland. Breland was hired by the Dantzlers as a land agent. At the time, he was also employed by the Finkbine Lumber Company, a competitor of Dantzler's. Breland's behaviour supports the traditional behavioural assumption in agency theory that individuals will maximize their own self-interests with guile. His access to information allowed him to profit at the expense of others. He used his connections in land-related transactions to achieve personal gain.

Keywords: Agency Theory; Timber; Agency Costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/095852098330567

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