Joint Audits: Does the Allocation of Audit Work Affect Audit Quality and Audit Fees?

Marcel Haak, Michelle Muraz and Roland Zieseniß

Accounting in Europe, 2018, vol. 15, issue 1, 55-80

Abstract: Audit quality and cost consequences of joint audits have been continually discussed, especially since the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper in 2010. We provide new empirical evidence for the French audit market. We show that a more balanced audit work allocation between the engaged audit firms reduces the audit quality and enhances the audit fees as compared to an unbalanced work allocation. We measure the quality effects following the concept of abnormal accruals and the concept of cosmetic earnings management. As unbalanced joint audits have parallels to single audits, our results have interest to those debating the benefits and costs of joint audits as compared to single audits.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/17449480.2018.1440611

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