Long-term audit engagements and opinion shopping: Spanish evidence

Emiliano Ruiz-Barbadillo, Nieves Gómez-Aguilar and Estibaliz Biedma-López

Accounting Forum, 2006, vol. 30, issue 1, 61-79

Abstract: Auditor tenure is an issue that has attracted considerable attention recently. This interest has focused mainly on determining whether long-term audit contracts improve the quality of the service. So far, research has failed to provide a definite answer to this question. In the face of this lack of consensus, we wish to analyze the relationship between the length of the audit contract and auditor independence. Specifically, using a model that includes control variables as proxies for the auditor’s economic incentives, we analyze whether long-term audit contracts increase the possibility of a company’s engaging in opinion shopping. We develop an opinion shopping model, together with univariate and logistic regression models. Our results show that the longer the audit engagement, the lower the probability of opinion shopping. The implications for mandatory auditor rotation regulation are also discussed.

Date: 2006
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1016/j.accfor.2005.03.007 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:accfor:v:30:y:2006:i:1:p:61-79

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/racc20

DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2005.03.007

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting Forum is currently edited by Carol Tilt

More articles in Accounting Forum from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().