Why did preparers lobby to the IASB's pension accounting proposals?

Justin Chircop and Paraskevi Vicky Kiosse

Accounting Forum, 2015, vol. 39, issue 4, 268-280

Abstract: We examine the characteristics of firms that lobbied on the 2010 Exposure Draft (ED) on pensions and find that signalling influences the decision to lobby. Further, we examine preparer's position to two important proposals in the ED. We find that preparers are less likely to agree with the abolition of the corridor when they report unrecognized actuarial losses and that firms are more likely to oppose the replacement of the expected rate of return with the discount rate when the spread between these two rates is large. These results suggest that while signalling drives firm decisions to lobby, self-interest influences how firms lobby.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:accfor:v:39:y:2015:i:4:p:268-280

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DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2015.09.002

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