 Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: some UK evidenceNoel O'Sullivan and Pauline Wong Accounting and Business Research, 1999, vol. 29, issue 2, 139-155 Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between internal and external control mechanisms in a sample of hostile takeover targets and a control group of non-target firms in the UK for the period 1989–93. The paper investigates whether there are significant differences in board composition, executive ownership and external shareholder control between the two groups. We find that hostile targets are more likely to have different individuals in the roles of chairman and CEO but employ non-executives with fewer additional directorships than non-targets. Executive share ownership is significantly lower in targets, suggesting that hostile bids are more likely to be pursued when target managers possess insufficient equity either to defeat the bid or make the bid too expensive for bidders. We find some evidence that institutional and unaffiliated blockholders in smaller targets help managers defeat unwanted bids. Date: 1999 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:29:y:1999:i:2:p:139-155 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/00014788.1999.9729575 Access Statistics for this article Accounting and Business Research is currently edited by Vivien Beattie More articles in Accounting and Business Research from Taylor & Francis Journals |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.