Analysts' earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives

Katrien Bosquet, Peter de Goeij and Kristien Smedts

Accounting and Business Research, 2015, vol. 45, issue 3, 307-322

Abstract: This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts' weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies , 19 (1), 319-355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2015.1009359

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