Tax degression and the political budget cycle in French municipalities

Marie-Estelle Binet () and Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2004, vol. 11, issue 14, 905-908

Abstract: This paper explores local incumbent behaviour during office. First, empirical evidence is given about the fiscal policy instruments by which French municipalities try to influence election outcome. Special care is taken about the econometric issues raised by the dynamic panel data setting. Secondly, a theoretical framework is built to investigate the political budget cycle when local taxation is degressive as in France. Its main results help understanding of the empirical findings.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000268642

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