Monopolistic pricing power for transgenic crops when technology adopters face irreversible benefits and costs

Robert Weaver and Justus Wessler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Justus Wesseler

Applied Economics Letters, 2004, vol. 11, issue 15, 969-973

Abstract: Pricing of biotechnology innovation under a patent grant is reconsidered in a model with uncertain returns and irreversible costs and benefits. Past results on restricted monopoly pricing in the presence of competing technologies showed that pricing power is reduced. The timing of adoption of an innovation is delayed and the pricing power of the restricted monopolist is further reduced when uncertainty and irreversibility is considered. The presence of irreversible benefits results in increased willingness-to-pay for the innovation, accelerating adoption, and increasing the innovator's restricted monopolist pricing power. Using Monte-Carlo simulation, the quantitative effects were approximated by a linear function through the hyper-plane.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:11:y:2004:i:15:p:969-973

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000285814

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().