Partial privatization and screening

Hongbin Li and Qian Wang

Applied Economics Letters, 2005, vol. 12, issue 11, 653-655

Abstract: It is shown that the government, in privatizing state owned enterprises, can use partial privatization as a screening mechanism to elicit private information from the manager about the firm's value. Although some new owners do not have maximum incentives, this screening contract allows the government to maximize its privatization revenues.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:12:y:2005:i:11:p:653-655

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500184215

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