Does complexity reduce coordination?

Gregory Parkhurst and Jason Shogren

Applied Economics Letters, 2005, vol. 12, issue 7, 447-452

Abstract: Herein it is shown that increased complexity does not necessarily imply more coordination failure. Experienced people playing a 4-player spatial grid game with over 68 000 strategy choices and (68 000)4 potential outcomes were as likely to find the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium as in a corresponding normal form game.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500092400

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