Individual strategies and aggregate behavior in a public-goods experiment

Walid Hichri

Applied Economics Letters, 2006, vol. 13, issue 15, 969-973

Abstract: Our aim is to see whether the general result of a decreasing over contribution over time in a public goods game is still available at the group and at the individual levels. We find that individuals are heterogeneous and that they interact differently.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500425329

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