Does the 'Market for Corporate Control' hypothesis explain takeover targets?

Costas Siriopoulos (), Antonios Georgopoulos and Athanasios Tsagkanos

Applied Economics Letters, 2006, vol. 13, issue 9, 557-561

Abstract: This study tests the 'Market for Corporate Control' hypothesis in a small open economy. The results appear to favour rejection of this hypothesis indicating that acquisitions have not been driven by managerial-disciplinary motives. Moreover, it is found that a logit model outperforms other statistical tests.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:13:y:2006:i:9:p:557-561

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850600731329

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