Selection games in Economics

Pu-yan Nie

Applied Economics Letters, 2007, vol. 14, issue 3, 223-225

Abstract: A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, based on selection in finite populations, is recently proposed by Taylor et al. (2004) and it is successful to explain some phenomena in biology. We now extend this model to the economic field. Some corresponding results are also obtained and some economic phenomena are rationally explained.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500425865

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