Does the proxy for shareholders' control make a difference in firm-performance regressions? Evidence from a blockholder system of corporate governance

Miguel Manjon Antolin

Applied Economics Letters, 2007, vol. 14, issue 6, 445-449

Abstract: One of the critical determinants of firm performance in corporate governance investigations is the degree of control exercised by large shareholders. This article empirically assesses the use of ultimate-owner ship shares and solutions of voting games (i.e. power indices) as alternative proxies for this control.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:14:y:2007:i:6:p:445-449

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500426020

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