The corporate effects of equity block creation and elimination
Stephen Ferris and
Smart Saensuk
Applied Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 15, issue 6, 431-436
Abstract:
This study examines how changes in block ownership effects firm value and performance for a sample of US firms over the period 1993-2001. We find that the creation of a new block has a significant impact on shareholder wealth while block elimination does not. The wealth effect is most pronounced when the new block-holder is a corporation. We also determine that announcement period returns are larger when purchasers are classified as permanent rather than temporary block-holders. We find that the creation of a permanent block-holder improves industry-adjusted operating performance more than that of a temporary block-holder. Block elimination, however, does not impact the firm's subsequent operating performance. Our analysis of the sequencing of changes in the number of block-holders shows that firm value increases only when a block purchase produces an initial block-holder. We find that the superior long-term market performance of firms with new block-holders is due to the presence of permanent block-holders.
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:15:y:2008:i:6:p:431-436
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850600706362
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