Estimation of competitive conduct when firms are efficiently colluding: addressing the Corts critique

Steven Puller ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 16, issue 15, 1497-1500

Abstract: I address a recent critique by Corts (1999) who finds that traditional approaches in New Empirical Industrial Organization to estimate the competitive conduct in an oligopoly market can yield inconsistent estimates of the conduct parameter if firms are engaged in efficient collusion. This article derives a general empirical model that allows consistent estimation of the conduct parameter that is robust to efficient collusion.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:16:y:2009:i:15:p:1497-1500

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504850701578900

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().