Another view of the social costs from rent seeking

David Kamerschen

Applied Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 16, issue 3, 273-275

Abstract: No matter whether the Posner or the game theory approach for measuring rent-seeking losses is utilized, the trapezoidal social costs of monopoly are significantly greater than the Harberger deadweight triangle allocative efficiency losses. This means public policy can improve social welfare in any country by reducing nonnatural monopolies.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850601018411

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