Determinants of bank supervisory agencies' power and accountability: a cross-country analysis

Ayse Evrensel

Applied Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 16, issue 8, 791-795

Abstract: This article empirically investigates the recent hypothesis advanced by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Barth et al. (2006) that countries' choices regarding bank regulations reflect their historical and political characteristics. Based on a dataset with 151 developed and developing countries, the empirical results verify that banking freedom, constraints on the political power, longer history of institutional evolution and the presence of common law are associated with less powerful and more accountable bank supervisory agencies. Therefore, policy efforts that are directed toward a change in banking regulations should be mindful of countries' historical and political characteristics.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:16:y:2009:i:8:p:791-795

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850701222012

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