The weight of bad governance in foreign mutual funds

Linus Wilson

Applied Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 17, issue 12, 1189-1192

Abstract: Empirical studies show that mutual funds are less likely to hold poorly governed foreign stocks. This theoretical model shows that foreign mutual fund managers will optimally lower their weight of badly governed stocks because they have higher costs of actively managing these holdings than their domestic rivals.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/17446540902817635

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