Asymmetric reimbursement system in an environmental conflict

Sung-Hoon Park ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 17, issue 12, 1197-1199

Abstract: This article explores how a fair-minded regulator has to set policy through an asymmetric reimbursement. The lawyer for a citizen group works on a contingent-fee basis, whereas a polluting firm has either in-house legal advice or lawyers on retainer. Under an asymmetric reimbursement rule we show: (i) the case goes to settlement if the objective merits of the case favour the citizen group; (ii) whereas it goes to trial, the probability winning the citizen group has is less than 50%, and the reimbursement policy incurs the total effort in trial to increase if the merits of the case favour the firm.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:12:p:1197-1199

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/00036840902845376

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().