Managerial entrenchment and corporate bond financing: evidence from Japan

Takanori Tanaka

Applied Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 17, issue 16, 1571-1574

Abstract: This article investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects corporate bond financing. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that firms with large corporate shareholders as controlling shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms. The results show that managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders has an influential impact on corporate bond financing.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:16:p:1571-1574

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504850903051508

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().