Institutional and economic determinants of corruption: a cross-section analysis

Ayse Evrensel

Applied Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 17, issue 6, 551-554

Abstract: In recent years, corruption and possible anti-corruption measures have been extensively discussed at the national, international and multilateral levels. This article provides an empirical analysis of corruption by viewing corruption as an evolutionary process. It assumes that the institutional set-up of the country such as the characteristics of the political and judicial system determines the extent of corruption. The empirical results confirm that countries with totalitarian political regimes, ineffective judicial systems and lower levels of education as well as slower economic growth and higher inflation rates tend to have higher levels of corruption.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:6:p:551-554

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850802297814

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