Congressional complicity in the baseball antitrust exemption: analysing senate voting patterns

Neil Longley

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 10, 945-947

Abstract: This article examines a key congressional vote on preserving baseball's antitrust exemption. It finds that the most important factor influencing a legislator's vote was whether there was a Major League Baseball (MLB) team in the legislator's constituency. This supports the notion that the professional sports industry has been effective in 'capturing' their political overseers.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.518945

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