Optimal tariff calculations in tariff games with climate change considerations

Yan Dong () and John Whalley

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 15, 1431-1435

Abstract: We discuss whether the introduction of climate change considerations into Nash tariff games increases or reduces post-retaliation tariffs. We briefly discuss how climate change considerations can be introduced into computational trade models. We then calculate optimal tariffs in comparable conventional (no climate change considerations present) and with climate change trade models. Results show that compared with conventional trade models, adding climate change considerations reduces the level of optimal tariffs, but this only occurs when the damage effects involved are large.

Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Tariff Calculations in Tariff Games with Climate Change Considerations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:15:p:1431-1435

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.541391

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().