A note on sibling rivalry and good-kid, bad-kid equilibria

Dennis Weisman

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 16, 1559-1563

Abstract: When parents with concave utility reward good behaviour on the part of their children with a share of the marginal utility they derive from good behaviour, a decrease in good behaviour by kid i causes kid j to increase the amount of good behaviour he/she supplies in equilibrium. This may explain why simultaneous good-kid behaviour is rare and also why children try to get their siblings into trouble.

Keywords: sibling rivalry; kid behaviour; bribery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.548779

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