All-pay auctions with discrete action spaces

James Boudreau ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 2, 161-162

Abstract: This article describes all-pay auctions with discrete action spaces and shows that pure-strategy Nash equilibria may exist. Such equilibria are shown to be potentially more favourable to both buyers and sellers than the more standard mixed-strategy equilibria, thus suggesting that it can be in the interest of both sides to limit bidders' action spaces.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:2:p:161-162

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DOI: 10.1080/13504850903442954

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