Public debt financing, ownership structures and bankers on boards: evidence from Japan

Takanori Tanaka

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 4, 315-318

Abstract: This article provides new insights on determinants that affect the allocation of bankers to firm boards by focusing on the benefits and costs they bring to the boards. Using data on Japanese firms during the period 2003-2007, we find that firms with lower credit ratings have higher proportions of bankers on their boards to gain easier access to bank credit. In contrast, firms with large shareholders face potential costs arising from conflicts of interest between large shareholders and banks, and accept fewer bankers on their boards. The results indicate that availability of public debt financing and ownership structures are important factors affecting the allocation of bankers to firm boards.

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article& ... 40C6AD35DC6213A474B5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:4:p:315-318

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851003689650

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().