Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano and Davide Ferrari

Applied Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 18, issue 7, 679-682

Abstract: We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:7:p:679-682

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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.485923

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