Trade, tariffs and terrorism

Peter Berck and Jonathan Lipow

Applied Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 19, issue 18, 1847-1849

Abstract: Insurgencies and terrorist activities are often dependent on foreign sources of funding. When this is the case, trade barriers such as import tariffs can prove to be an effective means of combating violence and enhancing social welfare. In this article, we identify the optimal tariff for a country facing an externally financed insurgency.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2012.667543

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