A Lotka--Volterra evolutionary model of China's incremental institutional reform

Yongjing Zhang ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 19, issue 4, 367-371

Abstract: Integrating evolutionary game theory with modern political economics, this article develops a Lotka--Volterra evolutionary model to explain China's incremental institutional reform. In this model, growth-oriented central leaders are intelligent designers of institutional changes; provincial and local leaders are potential predators; and private firms are potential prey. This model finds that improvements in the rule of law and in the protection of private property rights are not essential for short-run growth in China. Instead, the primary institutional source of China's economic success is the incremental reductions of discrimination policy against the private sector.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2011.579054

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