Short covering and price stabilization of IPOs

A. Signori, M. Meoli and S. Vismara

Applied Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 20, issue 10, 931-937

Abstract: Underwriters underprice Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and often, immediately after, repurchase shares in an attempt to stabilize the price. This ancillary service is not mandatory and can be provided by underwriters in the first month of trading. Using a sample of Italian IPOs, we investigate whether the price stabilization activity is carried out when actually needed. We document that only half of the IPOs that require this service are actually stabilized after going public. The fees charged by underwriters are not informative about the provision of this ancillary activity. Rather, the underwriter's reputation is negatively associated with the stabilization activity. Negative price revisions and negative (or low) underpricing also drive the provision of price stabilization.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.765536

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