A note on cartel ringleaders and the corporate leniency programme

Iwan Bos and Frederick Wandschneider

Applied Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 20, issue 11, 1100-1103

Abstract: Cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in some jurisdictions (e.g., the EU), whereas in others they are excluded (e.g., the US). This note shows that ringleader exclusion loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders. The latter may occur when the first firm that applies for leniency receives a sufficiently high discount.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.788777

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