A note on bank default risk under government capital injection coinciding with high future loss expectation

Jyh-Horng Lin, Chuen-Ping Chang and Hsiao-Ning Lin

Applied Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 20, issue 15, 1368-1373

Abstract: This article proposes a framework for bank default risk measure under government capital injection explicitly coinciding with an adverse signal that a rescued bank is expected to have significant future losses. A bank facing a serious problem of early closure may have a strong incentive to participate in a government assistance programme. Recipients of government capital injections are encouraged to make additional loans at a reduced margin, and then increase the default risk in the bank's equity returns. These results may be due to the conflicting goals of the government's capital injection programme for bank recapitalization and bank lending.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.810326

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