Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?

Iwan Bos, Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot

Applied Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 20, issue 6, 611-614

Abstract: This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? (2010)
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2012.725925

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