Federal Reserve independence: the Fed Funds Rate under different regimes
Adam T. Jones and
Mathew W. Snyder
Applied Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 21, issue 18, 1262-1265
Abstract:
The independence of central banks is an important feature of a properly functioning and stable monetary system. The structure of the Federal Reserve is designed to minimize political influence and insulate policy makers from political pressure. Nevertheless, members of the Fed's Federal Open Market Committee are members of society and informed about public opinion, potentially opening them to political bias, even if unintentional. This article uses a Taylor rule structure to examine changes in the Fed's reaction function to unemployment and inflation under different political administrations and chairman. Preliminary results show that the Fed is more responsive to the output gap under Republican presidential administrations and sets the Federal Funds Rate at a lower level under Republican administrations.
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2014.920473 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:18:p:1262-1265
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.920473
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips
More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().