Information disclosure and job search: evidence from a social networks experiment

Z. K. Dong, D. S. Huang and F. F. Tang

Applied Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 21, issue 4, 293-296

Abstract: We report the results of an experiment that determined the importance of an information disclosure policy in job search behaviour. We controlled the level of employment information disclosed after every experimental round. When we announced the subjects' wage levels, which at that point they had accepted along with their counterparts in a social network, the subjects' average reservation wages increased significantly according to their initial preference. However, when this information was not revealed, the reservation wage remained the same despite the availability of the social network. We suggest that the green-eyed monster effect may be significant in explaining these results.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2013.856992 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:4:p:293-296

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.856992

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().