The effects of a back-loaded compensation policy on the recruiting of older workers

Israel Luski and Miki Malul

Applied Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 21, issue 5, 312-316

Abstract: The goal of this article is to investigate the impact of back loading on the hiring of older workers. We argue that the impact of back loading on the motivation of a worker to put effort into work depends, among other variables, on the probability of being able to find another job. The less likely it is that one can find another job the more likely one is to exert a greater effort at work. Given that older workers are less likely to be able to find another job if they are dismissed from their current position, they are also less likely to shirk their obligations at work. Therefore, firms have to expend fewer resources monitoring their work. In addition, we demonstrate that the probability of employee misconduct declines with the number of years on the job even when the probability of detection remains constant.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2013.859364 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:5:p:312-316

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.859364

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().