Spousal employment and intra-household bargaining power
Applied Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 21, issue 8, 560-563
This article considers the relationship between work status and decision-making power of the head of household and his spouse. I used household fixed effects models to address the possibility that spousal work status may be correlated with unobserved factors that also affect bargaining power within the home. Consistent with the hypothesis that greater economic resources yield greater bargaining power, I found that the spouse of the head of household is more likely to be involved in making decisions when she has been employed. Similarly, the head of household is less likely to be the sole decision-maker when his spouse works.
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Working Paper: Spousal Employment and Intra-Household Bargaining Power (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:21:y:2014:i:8:p:560-563
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