Private sector bribery and effectiveness of anti-corruption policies

Rajeev Goel, Jelena Budak () and Edo Rajh

Applied Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 22, issue 10, 759-766

Abstract: This article examines the determinants of private-sector bribes, focusing on the relative effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Using survey data on Croatian firms, results show that, of the different anti-corruption policies (including internal and external policies), firms' internal code of ethics proved to be an effective deterrent. Firms might also be engaging in corruption among themselves to strategically counter perceived bureaucratic power. In other findings, male employees were more likely to engage in private-sector bribery, while firms located in the capital were less likely to do so. Policy implications are discussed.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.975326

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