Why do Chinese local governments transfer their rights of control over SOEs to the central government?

Weixing Cai, Fangming Xu and Cheng (Colin) Zeng

Applied Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 22, issue 15, 1252-1256

Abstract: This article investigates local authorities' motives for transferring their rights of control over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the central government. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that both employment and investment improves significantly following such transfers, and these findings are more pronounced among firms located in regions where the political pressure on local officials is higher. However, we fail to find any significant improvement in profitability. Our findings suggest that local governments tend to alleviate the political pressure they face by giving up their control rights and even sacrifice long-term economic benefits to do so.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1023931

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