Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence

David Kingsley and Thomas C. Brown

Applied Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 22, issue 7, 544-548

Abstract: Modern economies rely on central-authority institutions to regulate individual behaviour. Despite the importance of such institutions little is known about their formation within groups. In a public good experiment, groups selected the level of deterrence implemented by the institution, knowing that the administrative costs of the institution rose with the level of deterrence. Results suggest that groups readily self-impose costly deterrent formal institutions. The strictly deterrent institutions implemented here increased contributions sufficiently to completely offset the administrative cost and significantly increase earnings.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2014.955252 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:22:y:2015:i:7:p:544-548

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.955252

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().