'Bribing' regulators

Dennis L. Weisman

Applied Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 22, issue 7, 581-586

Abstract: The regulator's welfare function is a convex combination of consumer surplus, profits shared with the regulator and profits retained by the regulated firm. This analysis seeks to determine the conditions under which the regulated firm is able to 'bribe' the regulator with profit sharing to raise prices and realize positive profits in equilibrium.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.959649

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