The Seventeenth Amendment, Senate ideology and the growth of government

Danko Tarabar and Joshua Hall

Applied Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 22, issue 8, 637-640

Abstract: The Seventeenth Amendment disturbed the existing electoral system in the United States by requiring direct elections for state Senators. Scholars have argued this made the Senate more populist and contributed to the growth of government in the US post-1913. We employ econometric tools to investigate whether the mean ideology of the Senate and its winning policies experienced a structural change around the time of the enactment. We find no compelling evidence of a structural break at that time but do find some evidence for a change in the mid-to-late 1890s.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: The Seventeenth Amendment, Senate Ideology, and the Growth of Government (2014)
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2014.964824

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