Exploring the role of gender in common-pool resource extraction: evidence from laboratory and field experiments in fisheries

Daniel Revollo-Fernández, Alonso Aguilar-Ibarra, Fiorenza Micheli and Andrea Sáenz-Arroyo

Applied Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 23, issue 13, 912-920

Abstract: There is active debate on gender issues in natural resource management. For example, it is proposed that women are more cooperative than men when dealing with natural resources decisions; however, few scientific studies have directly addressed this hypothesis. We provide evidence for a greater cooperative attitude in women compared to men in both college students and coastal fishing communities of Baja California, Mexico, by means of game theory experiments. In both laboratory and field experiments, women changed their behaviour towards lower extraction compared to men, when regulations, sanctions or social scolding were introduced in the games. These results suggest that raising the role of women in decision-making, along with an adequate institutional framework, may lead to a more sustainable use of natural resources.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1119786

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