The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

Vicente Calabuig, Gonzalo Olcina () and Fabrizio Panebianco

Applied Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 23, issue 18, 1265-1268

Abstract: In this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1150940

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