Does anti-bribery enforcement deter foreign investment?

Brad Graham and Caleb Stroup

Applied Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 23, issue 1, 63-67

Abstract: This article presents the first empirical evidence that bilateral fixed capital flows fall in response to anti-bribery enforcement actions. We hand-collect data on individual enforcement actions initiated by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and show that anti-bribery enforcement in a country is followed by a 40% reduction in foreign fixed capital investments made by US companies in that country.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Does Anti-Bribery Enforcement Deter Foreign Investment? (2015)
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1049333

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