Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum games

Nikolaos Georgantzís (), Despoina Parasyri and Konstantinos Tsagarakis

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 12, 858-862

Abstract: In this article, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind. We analyse data from an ultimatum game played by Greek participants. Parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the receivers, after making their decisions. The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and males are more effective bargainers.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1237725

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