Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting
Hanna Hottenrott () and
John P. Weche
Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 13, 902-905
We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:13:p:902-905
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips
More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().