Economics at your fingertips  

Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

Florian Baumann, Achim Buchwald, Tim Friehe, Hanna Hottenrott () and John P. Weche

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 13, 902-905

Abstract: We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

Page updated 2020-02-17
Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:13:p:902-905