Tax enforcement and corporate profit shifting

Florian Baumann, Achim Buchwald, Tim Friehe, Hanna Hottenrott and John P. Weche

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 13, 902-905

Abstract: We present empirical evidence suggesting that weak tax enforcement proxied by the extent of tax evasion in a country acts like a lower corporate tax rate in attracting profits of multinational corporations.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331

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